Exercises
ex-cc-ch13-01
EasyCompute the expected rate under popularity caching for , , , Zipf-.
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.
Compute
. . Hit ratio: . files/round. Compare uniform case: . Zipf helps ~3Γ.
ex-cc-ch13-02
EasyFor decentralized coded caching with , , compute the decentralized rate and compare with centralized MAN.
Decentralized: .
Compute
Decentralized: . Centralized MAN: at integer . Decentralized slightly higher (gap vanishes as ).
ex-cc-ch13-03
EasyWhy does heterogeneous cache size not bottleneck MAN rate by the minimum cache?
Aggregate drives the rate.
Answer
MAN rate depends on , which for heterogeneous caches translates to . Rich-cache users hold more of the library and contribute to XOR messages that benefit poor-cache users. Poor-cache users still receive content but their own hit rate is lower. The aggregate cache is the key quantity.
ex-cc-ch13-04
EasyState the effective memory ratio under Zipf- (Ji-Tulino- Llorca-Caire 2017).
.
Formula
Under Zipf- with , effective memory ratio . For (uniform): . For : (almost all demand is concentrated in cache).
ex-cc-ch13-05
EasyExplain why decentralized caching is more deployable than centralized MAN.
No coordinator; users cache independently.
Answer
Centralized MAN requires a coordinator that tells each user exactly which combinatorial subset to cache. Real systems have dynamic users (come/go), different arrival times, and operators without central control. Decentralized random placement has each user independently sample, with no coordination. It achieves MAN-like rate asymptotically (MN 2015) while being operationally simple.
ex-cc-ch13-06
MediumCrossover between popularity and MAN. For , , (), find the Zipf exponent at which popularity caching expected rate equals MAN worst-case rate.
Solve numerically.
MAN rate
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Popularity expected rate
At (uniform): β much larger than MAN. At : . β still above MAN. At : -dominated; , . Ratio . β below MAN.
Crossover
Approximately . For popularity wins; for MAN wins in expectation.
Interpretation
For web / video (Ξ± = 0.6-1.2): MAN wins. For news / trending (Ξ± > 1.3): popularity wins.
ex-cc-ch13-07
MediumDecentralized rate proof. Derive the formula for decentralized MAN.
Each bit cached at any given user w.p. .
Sum over subsets of users by cardinality.
Setup
Under random placement, each bit is cached by a random subset . Pr( has size ): .
Per-subset delivery
For each subset of size , MAN delivery has XOR messages each of size proportional to the fraction of bits cached by exactly that subset: .
Sum
Total rate: ... (after simplification). Result: (per users); per-user: .
Asymptote
As : , so β same rate per user as centralized MAN.
ex-cc-ch13-08
MediumPopular file hit ratio. Under Zipf-, what fraction of demand is covered by the top 10% of files? ().
.
Approximation
For : . .
: (uniform, 10% demand). : . : , so for : . : . Using finite sum: top 10% covers ~90% demand.
Interpretation
Concentration grows dramatically with . At , "80/20 rule" emerges: small fraction of files dominates demand.
ex-cc-ch13-09
MediumHeterogeneous cache allocation. Given total budget (sum of all user caches), does it help to give all the storage to a few users and zero to others?
Aggregate matters, but worst-case bound .
Analysis
For users with total budget : . Under homogeneous allocation : , rate .
Under concentrated allocation (one user has , others zero): (same aggregate). Rate: (Sengupta-Tandon- Clancy) at most 2Γ the homogeneous rate.
Conclusion
Aggregate dominates; distribution matters only up to constant factors. For ops: give caches proportional to user activity (high-usage devices get more); fairness/battery tradeoffs also matter.
Extreme example
, files. Homogeneous . Alternative: 10 users with , 90 with . Rate in both cases is within factor 2. So heterogeneity is ~operationally neutral under MAN.
ex-cc-ch13-10
MediumHybrid placement. Construct a hybrid scheme (70% popularity, 30% random) for , , , . Analyze hit ratio.
Allocate files to popular, to random.
Popularity component
Top 70 files cached by all users. Hit ratio for requests in top 70: .
Random component
30 random files per user. Random user caches each of the remaining 930 files w.p. . Under Zipf, this covers ~ probability mass of non-popular content, which is ~ of total demand. So this component contributes hit rate.
Combined hit rate
β higher than pure popularity () or pure random ().
Coded gain
Random 30% enables MAN-style coded delivery. Effective caching gain picks up ~factor 2 compared to pure popularity. Hybrid is practically superior.
ex-cc-ch13-11
HardConverse for non-uniform demand. State an order-optimal lower bound on the expected rate under Zipf- demand and sketch its proof.
Cut-set argument with popularity-dependent weighting.
Statement
where is a constant depending on (but not ). Order-optimal with Ji-Tulino-Llorca-Caire achievability.
Proof sketch
Extend Yu-Maddah-Ali-Avestimehr '18 converse: average over permutations of users and over Zipf-biased demand. The resulting symmetric rate is at least MAN-like formula at .
Open
The constant is not determined exactly. Known: roughly for . Tight constant is an open problem.
ex-cc-ch13-12
HardAdversarial demand under Zipf. Suppose the adversary knows the popularity distribution and chooses the demand vector adversarially (subject to Zipf marginals). Does this change the MAN rate?
Marginal Zipf doesn't constrain the joint.
Setup
Marginal is Zipf-: . Joint is adversarial: correlated demands possible.
Adversary's optimal
Adversary maximizes rate. Can pick with maximum distinct demands (each sampled from top- popular files, adversarially).
Rate
MAN worst-case rate: , unchanged (MAN is demand-agnostic beyond distinct count). So adversarial Zipf doesn't hurt MAN: still worst-case optimal. Popularity caching, however, is hurt β adversary picks diverse unpopular files.
ex-cc-ch13-13
ChallengeOnline coded caching. If the content catalog evolves over time (new content arrives, old content leaves), how should the caching strategy adapt? Sketch a research direction.
Online learning + coded placement.
Problem
Standard MAN placement is static: fix once, use forever. With evolving content, the placement becomes stale (new popular content not cached; old cached content becomes unpopular).
Approaches
- Periodic refresh: every rounds, re-run MAN placement on current catalog.
- Online learning: bandit algorithms for cache content updates, balancing exploration vs exploitation.
- Lookahead placement: predict upcoming popular content (using engagement signals, social trends).
Open
Chapter 20 treats online coded caching. Caire-group research on online MAN is ongoing; current state-of-art achieves near-offline optimality under mild regret assumptions.
ex-cc-ch13-14
ChallengeMulti-level popularity / Pareto distribution. Real demand has been found to follow a stretched-exponential or Pareto distribution in some regimes (not pure Zipf). Do the Ji- Tulino-Llorca-Caire results extend?
Most results require concentration; Pareto/stretched-exp have different tail.
Pareto
Pareto: but only for rank above some threshold. Head is different.
Extension
The JTLC analysis extends as long as the tail decays sufficiently. For , order-optimality result holds with modified constants. For flatter distributions, MAN becomes more competitive.
Research
Yin-Caire et al. recent work (2023+) characterizes general heavy-tailed demand; results suggest universal effective behavior up to distribution- dependent constants.
ex-cc-ch13-15
ChallengeEconomic tradeoff: caching vs paying. Users may refuse to participate in D2D caching (too expensive in battery/storage). Design an incentive scheme that ensures participation while preserving the scaling.
Participation rate affects effective .
Model
Fraction of users participate (cache + serve). Effective network size . Per-user scaling: if is constant (does not vanish with ).
Incentives
Options:
- Reduced service cost for participants (e.g., free data).
- Payment / token reward for each D2D delivery served.
- Priority service at base station for active D2D contributors.
Game theory
Stable participation rate: cost of participating balanced by benefit . Network designer subsidizes participation () to ensure . Equilibrium analysis in Caire-group research (2019+).
Design
Practical schemes (Li-Fu-Caire 2021): tiered rewards based on contribution level, credit-based "I'll help if you helped me" reciprocity. Achieves - in simulation.