Secrecy Rate Maximization with RIS

The Joint Security Optimization

Section 15.1 defined the secrecy capacity CsC_s as a function of (v,Ξ¦)(\mathbf{v}, \boldsymbol{\Phi}). Section 15.2 formalizes the optimization problem and presents practical algorithms. Structurally similar to Chapter 5's joint comm optimization, but the objective is the difference of two log-SINRs, not a sum β€” a new optimization flavor.

Definition:

Joint RIS Secrecy Rate Maximization

The secrecy rate maximization is

β€…β€Šmax⁑v,Ξ¦β€…β€ŠRs(v,Ξ¦)=[log⁑2(1+SNRB)βˆ’log⁑2(1+SNRE)]+β€…β€Š\boxed{\;\max_{\mathbf{v}, \boldsymbol{\Phi}}\; R_s(\mathbf{v}, \boldsymbol{\Phi}) = [\log_2(1 + \text{SNR}_{B}) - \log_2(1 + \text{SNR}_{E})]^+\;}

subject to power constraints and βˆ£Ο•n∣=1|\phi_n| = 1.

Without the [β‹…]+[\cdot]^+: the objective is a difference of log- SINRs. At high SNR, this reduces to log⁑2(SNRB/SNRE)\log_2(\text{SNR}_{B}/\text{SNR}_{E}). The design goal: maximize the channel contrast between Bob and Eve β€” not just Bob's SINR.

,

Theorem: High-SNR Secrecy Approximation

Under high-SNR regime, the secrecy-rate optimization simplifies to

max⁑v,Φ∣hBH(Φ)v∣2∣hEH(Φ)v∣2\max_{\mathbf{v}, \boldsymbol{\Phi}} \frac{|\mathbf{h}_B^H(\boldsymbol{\Phi}) \mathbf{v}|^2}{|\mathbf{h}_E^H(\boldsymbol{\Phi}) \mathbf{v}|^2}

(a ratio, not a difference). This is a generalized eigenvalue problem in v\mathbf{v} for fixed Ξ¦\boldsymbol{\Phi}; becomes a harder non-convex problem in Ξ¦\boldsymbol{\Phi}.

At high SNR, log⁑(1+SNR)β‰ˆlog⁑(SNR)\log(1 + \text{SNR}) \approx \log(\text{SNR}). Secrecy rate reduces to log⁑(SNRB/SNRE)=log⁑∣hBHv∣2βˆ’log⁑∣hEHv∣2\log(\text{SNR}_{B}/\text{SNR}_{E}) = \log|\mathbf{h}_B^H \mathbf{v}|^2 - \log|\mathbf{h}_E^H \mathbf{v}|^2. The optimization aims to maximize the ratio of signal powers at Bob vs. Eve β€” a geometric interpretation.

AO for RIS Secrecy Rate

Complexity: O(Tβ‹…(Nt3+Cpassive))O(T \cdot (N_t^{3} + C_{\text{passive}})); T ~ 15 iterations
Input: hB,d,hB,2,hE,d,hE,2,H1\mathbf{h}_{B,d}, \mathbf{h}_{B,2}, \mathbf{h}_{E,d}, \mathbf{h}_{E,2}, \mathbf{H}_1, power PtP_t.
Output: (v⋆,Φ⋆)(\mathbf{v}^\star, \boldsymbol{\Phi}^\star) maximizing RsR_s.
1. Initialize Ξ¦(0)\boldsymbol{\Phi}^{(0)} (e.g., matched to Bob).
2. Repeat t=0,1,…t = 0, 1, \ldots:
3. \quad Compute hB,hE\mathbf{h}_B, \mathbf{h}_E given Ξ¦(t)\boldsymbol{\Phi}^{(t)}.
4. \quad Active update: solve generalized eigenvalue problem for v(t+1)\mathbf{v}^{(t+1)}
(dominant vector of (hBhBH,hEhEH+ρI)(\mathbf{h}_B\mathbf{h}_B^H, \mathbf{h}_E\mathbf{h}_E^H + \rho \mathbf{I})).
5. \quad Passive update: solve
maxβ‘βˆ£Ο•n∣=1log⁑(1+SNRB)βˆ’log⁑(1+SNRE)\max_{|\phi_n|=1} \log(1 + \text{SNR}_{B}) - \log(1 + \text{SNR}_{E})
via SDR or manifold method. Can include artificial-noise term.
6. \quad Check convergence.
7. return (v,Ξ¦)(\mathbf{v}, \boldsymbol{\Phi}).

The active update has a closed-form solution via generalized eigenvalue decomposition (unlike WMMSE for sum rate). The passive update is the harder subproblem; SDR gives tight relaxation for single-Eve scenarios.

Secrecy Rate AO Convergence

Trace the secrecy rate vs. iteration under AO. Compare the RIS-aided secrecy with a no-RIS baseline. The RIS contribution grows over iterations as Ξ¦\boldsymbol{\Phi} learns to null Eve.

Parameters
64
4
10
0.2

Example: Expected Secrecy Gain from RIS

Nt=4,N=64,Pt/Οƒ2=10Β dBN_t = 4, N = 64, P_t/\sigma^2 = 10\text{ dB}. Bob and Eve have independent Rayleigh channels. No-RIS baseline has zero secrecy (Eve randomly better half the time). Estimate the RIS-aided secrecy rate.

Secrecy vs. Communication Tradeoff

Maximizing secrecy rate is not the same as maximizing Bob's rate. For comm: focus only on Bob. For secrecy: focus on Bob and null at Eve.

Consequence: under RIS-aided secrecy optimization, Bob's received rate may be slightly lower than under pure comm optimization, because some DoF are spent nulling Eve.

In practice, the secrecy-optimal Φ\boldsymbol{\Phi} gives Bob ∼90\sim 90-95%95\% of the pure-comm rate, with the remainder spent ensuring Eve's rate stays small. Acceptable tradeoff for security-critical services.

Common Mistake: Check for Positive Secrecy

Mistake:

"Apply the secrecy maximization AO blindly; trust whatever it outputs."

Correction:

If Cs=0C_s = 0 is achievable with positive RBβˆ’RER_B - R_E at the input, the optimization may find negative-secrecy solutions (Eve stronger than Bob), returning Rs=0R_s = 0. Always verify:

  1. Is the input channel geometry favorable? (Bob's geometric RIS path exists with adequate Ξ±Ξ²\alpha \beta.)
  2. Does the AO converge to positive RsR_s? If not, consider alternative: artificial noise (Section 15.3) or different RIS placement.
  3. Under imperfect Eve CSI, apply robust design (Section 15.4) or abandon secrecy and use cryptography instead.